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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
1 Appellant filed his appeal in the Supreme Court of Utah on November 7, 
2000 Thereaftei, the Supreme Court under date of Januaiy 17, 2001, directed that the 
case be tiansfened to the Court of Appeals foi disposition Appellant appeals fiom the 
Ordei of the Honoiable Rodney S Page dated October 5, 2000, which granted Davis 
County's Motion to Dismiss 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 It is Appellee Davis County's position that Appellant raises no issue to be 
decided by this Court and, consequently, the ruling of the lower Court dismissing 
Plaintiffs Complaint against Appellee Davis County should be affirmed The Brief of 
Appellant is so muddled and flawed that Appellee Davis County will not attempt to 
mteipret the issues raised by it Rathei, the issue which Appellee Davis County addresses 
is that the lower Court was correct in granting Appellee Davis County's Motion to 
Dismiss and this Court should affirm the decision of the lower Court 
2 Appellant is not entitled to an awaid of attorney's fees against Appellee 
Davis County 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable rules and statutes aie as follows 
1 Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
2 Section 78-3-13 4, Utah Code Ann, (1953) as amended, 
3 Section 78-3-19, Utah Code Ann , (1953) as amended, 
1 
4. Section 78-3-14.2, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, 
5. Section 78-3-24, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, and 
6. Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, disposes of 
Appellant's claim for attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS 
On July 23, 1997, Appellant filed his Complaint pro se in the District Court of 
Davis County naming Appellee Davis County as a party defendant. The prayer for relief 
by Appellant against Appellee Davis County is as follows: 
Denis County shall on August 22, 1997, impanel in Davis 
County a jury of its citizens to determine the facts of 
Plaintiffs Davis County real property with the Honorable A. 
Lynn Payne presiding. 
Appellant alleges in his Complaint that he is the owner of certain property located in 
Davis County, but Appellee Davis County is not the owner of the property, nor is 
Appellee Davis County in any contractual relationship with Appellant. 
Appellee Davis County filed its Motion to Dismiss with the Court on August 5, 
1997, asserting that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed for the reason that it failed 
to state a claim against Davis County upon which relief could be granted. Appellee Davis 
County's Motion to Dismiss was granted by the Court on October 5, 2000. Thereafter, 
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 3, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under no facts that could be presented before the District Court would Appellee 
2 
Davis County, a body politic of the State of Utah, have authority to empanel a jury to 
hear a case and require that it be before a District Court Judge from Uintah County. 
Therefore, the lower Court properly granted Appellee Davis County's Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DAVIS COUNTY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE NO FACTS PRESENTED 
BEFORE THE COURT WOULD AUTHORIZE APPELLEE DAVIS 
COUNTY TO IMPANEL A JURY TO HEAR A CASE AND 
REQUIRE THAT IT BE BEFORE A DISTRICT JUDGE FROM 
UINTAH COUNTY. 
Plaintiffs Complaint and his numerous motions and memoranda are garbled and 
unclear as to what the basis is for his claim against Appellee Davis County. It appears 
from his Complaint he asserts ownership in propeity that is located within Davis County 
but no claim is made that Appellee Davis County owns any propeity in which he claims 
an interest or is any contractual relationship with Appellee Davis County. The prayer in 
the Complaint of Appellant is as follows: 
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendants as 
follows... (2) Davis County shall on August 22, 1997 empanel 
in Davis County, a Jury of its citizens to determine the facts 
of plaintiffs Davis County Real Property with the Hon. A. 
Lynn Payne, presiding. 
The prayer in Appellant's Complaint is more in the form of a special writ requiring 
Appellee Davis County to impanel a jury, thereby allowing Appellant's claim to be heard. 
Appellee Davis County has not operated or been responsible for the operation of 
the District Courts for many years. Pursuant to Section 78-3-13.4, Utah Code Ann., 
(1953) as amended, the County's deteimination to tiansfer the responsibility for operation 
of the District Court to the State is irrevocable. Moreover, in Section 78-3-14.2, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) as amended, the Legislature mandated that the District Court, not the 
County, develop a system of case management. Additionally, in Section 78-3-19, Utah 
Code Ann., (1953) as amended, the Legislature created an administrative system for all 
courts of the State which is separate and apart from any control that could be exercised by 
Appellee Davis County. Under Section 78-3-24, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, the 
Court Administrator is given responsibility to manage the non-judicial activities of the 
Courts. 
Under no facts presented by Plaintiff/Appellant would Davis County be authorized 
to impanel a jury. The District Court or the Court Administrator's Office would have 
jurisdiction and control over the court system and not Appellee Davis County. In Liquor 
Control Commissioners v. Athas, 243P.2d 441 (Utah 1952), the Court ruled that a 
complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the Plaintiff 
would be entitled to no relief under state of facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim. Appellee Davis County respectfully asserts that Plaintiff Appellee is entitled to no 
relief against Appellee Davis County under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of his claim. Therefore, Appellee Davis County urges the Court to affirm the 
ruling of the District Court which granted Appellee Davis County's Motion to Dismiss. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
AGAINST APPELLEE DAVIS COUNTY. 
Appellant in his prayer for relief demands attorney's fees against Appellee Davis 
County. Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, states the following : 
A court may awardcosts and attorney's fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 
28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorneys' fees. 
The statutory provision is consistent with prior Utah case law. In Carr v. Enoch 
Smith Co., 781.P2d 1292 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989), the court said: 
We do, however, find error in awarding attorney's fees in 
favor of Smith. "The general rule in Utah is that attorney 
fees cannot be recovered absent statutory authorization or 
contract. " Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association. 757 P. 2d 483, 486 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1988). See also Mecham v Benson 590P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 
1979)... 
At page 1296. 
There is no promissory note, written contract or any other written instrument 
executed by Davis County that would authorize the payment of attorney's fees. 
Therefore, Appellant is entitled to no award of attorney's fees against Appellee Davis 
County. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee Davis County respectfully submits that based upon the foregoing 
arguments this Court must dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /S~ day of June, 2001. 
Gerald ^ r Hess, Chief Ctvil Deputy 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Davis County 
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Exhibit 1 
39 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A L.R 4th eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
249. signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
Inherent power of federal district court to for securities fraud, 97 A.L R Fed 107 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel m ab- Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A L.R Fed 789
 e r a i Ru i e s 0f Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
Comment Note — General principles regard- signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
mg imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
 f o r infhction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed jreci 442 107 
, „
 J 1 T* i -« m 1 Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
Imposmon of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
 e r a [ R u l e g o f C m l p r o c e d u p e r t a l m n g t o 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to j ^ ,
 r i f ± 
, .n . r i J a. signing and verification of pleadings, m anti-
signmg and verification of pleadings, m actions e * 99 A L R Fed 573 
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181 t n i s t a c T° n s /
 r 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed- Procedural requirements for imposition of 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed 5o6. 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.LR Fed 13 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service 
*of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or. if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by 
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a 
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial 
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after 
notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim 
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
vithin such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 40 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a S300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.) 
Exhibit 2 
78-3-13 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 152, § 26 and ch. district judge may hold court in any county on 
248, § 50 each repeals § 78-3-13, as amended request, effective April 25, 1988. 
by Laws 1969, ch. 250, § 1, providing that a 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities - Staff - Budget. 
(1) A county's determination to transfer responsibility for operation of the 
district court to the state is irrevocable. 
(2) (a) Court space suitable for the conduct of judicial business as specified 
by the Judicial Council shall be provided by the state from appropriations 
made by the Legislature for these purposes. 
(b) The state may, in order to carry out its obligation to provide these 
facilities, lease space from a county, or reimburse a county for the number 
of square feet used by the district. Any lease and reimbursement shall be 
determined in accordance with the standards of the State Building Board 
applicable to state agencies generally. A county or municipality terminat-
ing a lease with the court shall provide written notice to the Judicial 
Council at least one year prior to the effective date of the termination. 
(c) District courts shall be located in municipalities that are sites for the 
district court or circuit court as of January 1,1994. Removal of the district 
court from the municipality shall require prior legislative approval by 
joint resolution. 
(3) The state shall provide legal reference materials for all district judges' 
chambers and courtrooms, as required by Judicial Council rule. Maintenance 
of county law libraries shall be in consultation with the court executive of the 
district court. 
(4) (a) At the request of the Judicial Council, the county or municipality 
shall provide staff for the district court in county seats or municipalities 
under contract with the administrative office of the courts. 
(b) Payment for necessary expenses shall be by a contract entered into 
annually between the state and the county or municipality, which shall 
specifically state the agreed costs of personnel, supplies, and services, as 
well as the method and terms of payment. 
(c) Workload measures prepared by the state court administrator and 
projected costs for the next fiscal year shall be considered in the negotia-
tion of contracts. 
(d) Each May 1 preceding the general session of the Legislature, the 
county or municipality shall submit a budget request to the Judicial 
Council, the governor, and the legislative fiscal analyst for services to be 
rendered as part of the contract under Subsection (b) for the fiscal year 
immediately following the legislative session. The Judicial Council shall 
consider this information in developing its budget request. The legislative 
fiscal analyst shall provide the Legislature with the county's or munici-
pality's original estimate of expenses. By June 15 preceding the state's 
fiscal year, the county and the state court administrator shall negotiate a 
contract to cover expenses in accordance with the appropriation approved 
by the Legislature. The contracts may not include payments for expenses 
of service of process, indigent defense costs, or other costs or expenses 
provided by law as an obligation of the county or municipality. 
22 
DISTRICT COURTS 78-3-14.5 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-13.4, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
1988, ch. 152, § 20; 1991, ch. 268, § 26; 1996, ment, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote this see-
ch. 198, § 52. tion. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 78-3-13.5 (L. 1963, ch. § 26 and ch. 248, § 50 both repeal § 78-3-14, 
191, § 2), relating to election of presiding dis- Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to ex parte 
trict judge and assignment ofjudges to assist in applications from another district, effective 
trial of cases in other districts, was repealed by April 25, 1988. 
Laws 1967, ch. 222, § 9. Laws 1988, ch. 152, 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
(1) The district court of each district shall develop systems of case manage-
ment. 
(2) The case management systems developed by a district court shall: 
(a) ensure judicial accountability for the just and timely disposition of 
cases; 
(b) provide for each judge a full judicial work load that accommodates 
differences in the subject matter or complexity of cases assigned to 
different judges; and 
(c) provide that judges of the district court and judges of the court 
formerly denominated the circuit court who took office prior to July 1, 
1991, are entitled to be assigned only cases from the subject matter 
jurisdiction of their respective courts as that jurisdiction existed on June 
30, 1996. If the volume of such cases does not constitute a full work load, 
other cases shall be assigned. 
(3) A district court may establish divisions within the court for the efficient 
management of different types of cases. The existence of divisions within the 
court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court orders. 
The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public access to the 
courts. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-14.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 198, § 70 
1996, ch. 198, § 53. makes the act effective on July 1, 1996. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures 
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute 
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction 
shall be remitted V2 to the state treasurer and V2 to the treasurer of the 
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation. 
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Re-
sources Code of Utah, or Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid 
to the state treasurer. 
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to 
the Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund. 
(b) For violations of Title 73, Chapter 18, the state treasurer shall 
allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the 
General Fund. 
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court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court orders. 
The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public access to the 
courts. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-14.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 198, § 70 
1996, ch. 198, § 53. makes the act effective on July 1, 1996. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures 
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute 
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction 
shall be remitted ¥z to the state treasurer and Vi to the treasurer of the 
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation. 
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Re-
sources Code of Utah, or Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid 
to the state treasurer. 
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to 
the Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund. 
(b) For violations of Title 73, Chapter 18, the state treasurer shall 
allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the 
General Fund. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — The 
Training of Court Managers, 1981 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 683. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
The purpose of this act is to create an administrative system for all courts of 
this state, subject to central direction by the Judicial Council, to enable these 
courts to provide uniformity and coordination in the administration of justice. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-19, enacted by L. to the appointment of assistants by the admin-
1973, ch. 202, § 2; 1977, ch. 77, § 57; 1983, istrator, and enacts the above section. 
ch. 156, § 1; 1986, ch. 47, § 51. Meaning of "this act." - The term "this 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws act" refers to Laws 1973, ch. 202, which enacted 
1973, ch. 202, § 2 repeals former § 78-3-19 (L. §§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27 
1967, ch. 222, § 3; 1971, ch. 209, § 1), relating 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Administrator" means the administrator of the courts appointed 
under Section 78-3-23. 
(2) "Conference" means the annual statewide judicial conference estab-
lished by Section 78-3-27. 
(3) "Council" means the Judicial Council established by Article VIII, 
Sec. 12, Utah Constitution. 
(4) "Courts" mean all courts of this state, including all courts of record 
and not of record. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-20, enacted by L. 209, § 2), relating to designation, compensa-
1973, ch. 202, § 3; 1977, ch. 77, § 58; 1983, tion and powers of an assignment justice, and 
ch. 156, § 2; 1986, ch. 47, § 52; 1988, ch. 248, enacts the above section. 
§ 13. Meaning of "this act." - The term "this 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws act" refers to Laws 1973, ch. 202, which enacted 
1973, ch. 202, § 3 repeals former § 78-3-20 (L. §§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27 
1967, ch. 222, § 4; 1969, ch. 251, § 1; 1971, ch. 
78-3-21, Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — Re-
ports [Effective until January 1, 1997]. 
(1) The Judicial Council, established by Article VIII, Section 12, Utah 
Constitution, shall be composed of: 
(a) the chief justice of the Supreme Court; 
(b) one member elected by the justices of the Supreme Court; 
(c) one member elected by the judges of the Court of Appeals; 
(d) five members elected by the judges of the district courts; 
(e) two members elected by the judges of the juvenile courts; 
(f) three members elected by the justice court judges; and 
< g) a member or ex officio member of the Board of Commissioners of the 
Utah State Bar who is an active member of the Bar in good standing 
elected by the Board of Commissioners. 
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78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
The Supreme Court shall appoint a chief administrative officer of the council 
who shall have the title of the administrator of the courts and shall serve at the 
pleasure of the council and/or the Supreme Court. The administrator shall be 
selected on the basis of professional ability and experience in the field of public 
administration and shall possess an understanding of court procedures as well 
as of the nature and significance of other court services. He shall devote his full 
time and attention to the duties of his office, and shall receive a salary equal 
to that of a district judge. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-23, enacted by L. Sunset Act. - See § 63-55-278 for the re-
1973, ch. 202, § 6. peal date of the Office of the Court Admimstra-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws tor, created by this section. 
1973, ch. 202, § 6 repeals former § 78-3-23 (L. Cross-References. — State court admmis-
1967, ch 222, § 7), the title of the Court Ad- trator, Rule 3-301, Code of Judicial Admimstra-
ministrator Act, and enacts the above section tion. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Court Commissioners <§=» 
1 to 3. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and re-
sponsibilities. 
Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
and within the policies established by the council, the administrator shall: 
(1) organize and administer all of the nonjudicial activities of the 
courts; 
(2) assign, supervise, and direct the work of the nonjudicial officers of 
the courts; 
(3) implement the standards, policies, and rules established by the 
council; 
(4) formulate and administer a system of personnel administration, 
including in-service training programs; 
(5) prepare and administer the state judicial budget, fiscal, accounting, 
and procurement activities for the operation of the courts of record, and 
assist justices'courts in their budgetary, fiscal, and accounting procedures; 
(6) conduct studies of the business of the courts, including the prepa-
ration of recommendations and reports relating to them; 
(7) develop uniform procedures for the management of court business, 
including the management of court calendars; 
(8) maintain liaison with the governmental and other public and 
private groups having an interest in the administration of the courts; 
(9) establish uniform policy concerning vacations and sick leave for 
judges and nonjudicial officers of the courts; 
(10) establish uniform hours for court sessions throughout the state and 
may, with the consent of the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, call 
and appoint justices or judges of courts of record to serve temporarily as 
Court of Appeals, district court, or juvenile court judges and set reasonable 
compensation for their services; 
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(11) when necessary for administrative reasons, change the county for 
trial of any case if no party to the litigation files timely objections to this 
change; 
(12) organize and administer a program of continuing education for 
judges and support staff, including training for justices of the peace; 
(13) provide for an annual meeting for each level of the courts of record, 
and the annual judicial conference; and 
(14) perform other duties as assigned by the presiding officer of the 
council. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-24, enacted by L. court" before "judges" near the end of Subsec-
1973, ch. 202, § 7; 1977, ch. 77, § 60; 1981, tion (10). 
ch. 90, § 6; 1983, ch. 156, § 5; 1986, ch. 47, Cross-References. - Court administra-
§ 55; 1988, ch. 248, § 15; 1996, ch. 198, § 56. tors, Rule 3-301, Code of Judicial Administra-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- tion. 
ment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted "or circuit 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 R2d 
920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Court Commissioners §=> 
1, 3 to 5. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment of trial court executives. 
(1) The administrator of the courts, with the approval of the presiding officer 
of the council, is responsible for the establishment of positions and salaries of 
assistants as necessary to enable him to perform the powers and duties vested 
in him by this act, including the positions of appellate court administrator, 
district court administrator, juvenile court administrator, and justices' court 
administrator, whose appointments shall be made by the administrator of the 
courts with the concurrence of the respective boards as established by the 
council. 
(2) The district court administrator, with the concurrence of the presiding 
judge of a district or the district court judge in single judge districts, may 
appoint in each district a trial court executive. The trial court executive may 
appoint, subject to budget limitations, necessary support personnel including 
clerks, research clerks, secretaries, and other persons required to carry out the 
work of the court. The trial court executive shall supervise the work of all 
nonjudicial court staff and serve as administrative officer of the district. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3-25, enacted by L. court administrator" from the list of adminis-
1973, ch. 202, § 8; 1983, ch. 156, § 6; 1986, trators in Subsection (1). 
ch. 47, § 56; 1996, ch. 198, § 57. Meaning of "this act." - The term uthis 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- act," in Subsection (1), refers to Laws 1973, ch. 
ment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted "circuit 202, which enacted §§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27. 
34 
Exhibit 3 
78-27-56.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occiden-
tal/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 R2d 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Cascade Energy & Metals 
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Ac-
tions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Note, "The Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah," 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 571. 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
state statute or rule subjecting party making 
untrue allegations or denials to payment of 
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209. 
Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 
44 A.L.R.4th 776. 
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for state-
court award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Attorney's liability under state law for oppos-
ing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486. 
Recovery of attorneys' fees and costs of litiga-
tion incurred as result of breach of agreement 
not to sue, 9 AL.R.5th 933. 
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party 
based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or 
other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833. 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
History: C. 1953,78-27-56.5, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 79, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Cited. 
Discretion of court. 
In an action involving claims for breach of 
warranty, misrepresentation, and mutual mis-
take, where the only claim stemmed from the 
contract, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to determine not to attempt to 
allocate the attorney's fees and denial of attor-
ney fees was appropriate. Schafir v. Harrigan, 
879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Sharp, 
840 R2d 796 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Attorney's liability under state law 
for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 
486. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees 
in matters involving real estate, 10 A.L.R.5th 
448. 
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Lynn Allan Jenkins I. 
Three East 2750 South 
Bountiful Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 299-1520 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN ALLAN JENKINS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT "LYNN" PAYNE, DAVID 
YOUNG PAYNE, UTAH STATE BAR, 
NORTH SALT LAKE CITY, DAVIS 
COUNTY, and UINTAH COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT WITH 
JURY DEMAND 
civil NO. c\ioiirr>) 
RODNEYS. PAGE 
Judge D-'STRICT JUDGF 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF Lynn Allan Jenkins and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of Davis 
County, Utah, and has been for more than five years immediately 
prior to the commencement of this action and owns or controls 
property in Davis County. 
2. Plaintiff and Linda Marie Mitchell Jenkins are husband 
and wife, having been married at Magna City Utah, on the 22 nd day 
of August, 1962. 
3. Plaintiff and his wife have six children as issue of 
said marriage, to-wit: 
JULIE ANN, born July 16, 1963 
LYNN ALLAN, born July 2, 19 64 
ANDREW CHRISTEN, born February 15, 1969 
JODIE MARIE, born July 6, 1970 
MICHELLE DEONE, born April 6, 1974 
MICHAEL DAVID, born November 6, 197 6 
Said children are now in their own care and custody. 
4. Defendant Albert "Lynn" Payne, resides in Uintah 
County, Utah, and is believed to be the son of "Albert" L. Payne 
and Sylvia Young Payne. Defendant Lynn Payne is also a Utah 
District Court Judge for Uintah County and a member in good 
standing with the Utah State Bar. 
5. Defendant David Young Payne resides in Davis County 
Utah, and is believed to be the son of "Albert" L. Payne and Sylvia 
Young Payne. Defendant David Young Payne, is a Judge for North Salt 
Lake City, Utah and a member in good standing with the Utah State 
Bar. 
6. Defendant Utah State Bar is the regulatory branch for 
the practice of law in the State of Utah. 
7. On January 11, 1995, on a public highway called 
Interstate 15, in North Salt Lake City, Utah, plaintiff was stopped 
by the Utah Highway Patrol for crossing over the left yellow line 
of said highway for a distance of approximately 50 feet at 60 MPH. 
8. Plaintiff after taking and passing a blood alcohol 
breath test, was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol even though he had a negative blood alcohol level as shown 
on North Salt Lake City's breath machine. 
9. As a result plaintiff was thrown into jail and blood 
was taken from his body and given to the U.S. Mail Service's 
custody who then delivered the blood samples to the Utah Department 
of Health about one week later. The blood samples analyzed by the 
Department of Health showed a negative alcohol level however 72 
2 
nano grams of alprazalam which North Salt Lake City determined to 
be beyond any therapeutic level allowed under Utah law, 
10. On or about January 12, 1995, plaintiff filed a 
demand for Jury Trial with the North Salt Lake City Court, which 
was denied by its judge the Hon. David Young Payne and City 
Prosecutor Michael Nielsen. 
11. On or about March 15, 1995, plaintiff filed with the 
Hon. A. Lynn Payne a demand for Jury Trial in a Uintah County cause 
of action that should more properly in the jurisdiction of Davis 
County. 
12. On or about April 26, 19 95, Judge A. Lynn Payne ruled 
that plaintiff was not entitled to a Jury Trial on his Davis County 
real property and its Uniform Real Estate Contract purportedly date 
December 26, 1977, which clearly was paid in full on December 27, 
1977 as recorded by the Davis County Recorder in August 1978. 
13. July 16, 1997, Judge Lynn Payne ruled that the Utah 
State Bar picnic to be held on August 22, 1997 at a park near his 
home, was more important than the plaintiff's wife and his Thirty-
fifth Wedding Anniversary and scheduled his continuing non-jury 
trial on the plaintiff's Davis County real property. 
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendants as 
follows (1) the Utah State Bar shall cancel its August 22, 1997, 
Basin Bar Picnic so that plaintiff may attend his wife Anniversary 
Party; (2) Davis County shall on August 22, 1997 empanel in Davis 
County, a Jury of its citizens to determine the facts of 
plaintiff's Davis County Real Property with the Hon. A. Lynn Payne, 
3 
presiding; (3) that North Salt Lake City shall grant plaintiff a 
Jury Trial in its courtroom on the issues of its January 11, 1995 
DUI arrest; (4) Uintah County shall file a report with the court as 
to its findings an conclusions of law concerning the Uintah County 
Court lawsuit; (5) for plaintiff's costs and attorney fees; AND for 
such other relief the^court deem proper. 
DATED this yQ day of July 1997. 
Plaintiff 
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RECEIVED 
0Ct 10 2CC0 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
LYNN ALLAN JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs 
ALBERT "LYNN" PAYNE, DAVID 
YOUNG PAYNE, UTAH STATE BAR, 
NORTH SALT LAKE CITY, DAVIS 
COUNTY and UINTAH COUNTY 
Defendant(s) 
RULING ON DEFENDANT NORTH 
SALT LAKE CITY AND DAVIS 
COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(ENTITLED MOTION FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT) 
Case No 970700315 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed Defendant North Salt Lake City and Davis 
County's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Entitled Motion for 
Declaratory Judgment) and having reviewed the Memorandums in support thereof and in 
opposition thereto and having heard the arguments of Plaintiff and counsel and being fully 
advised in the premises, the Court hereby rules as follows 
The Motions of North Salt Lake City and Davis County to dismiss are hereby granted 
based upon the arguments set forth in their respecm e Memorandums filed in support thereof 
As to Plaintiffs Motion Entitled Motion for Declaratory Judgment which the Court treats 
as a motion for summary judgment, the Court rules as follows 
This Court has this date and heretofore either granted the motion of each defendant to 
dismiss or dismissed them by stipulation and therefore, denies the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Further, since there are no defendants left, the Court hereby dismisses 
Plaintiffs Complaint for no cause of action. 
Dated this <g~^ day of October, 2000. 
By the Court: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following 
Mr Lynn A Jenkins 
Three East 2750 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Mr Gerald E Hess 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
P O Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Mr Kent L Christiansen 
448 East 400 South, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City UT 841111 
Dated this *f day of October, 2000. 
Clerk/ Deputy Clerk 
